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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 






David Kinyua Mwongera petitions for review of the Board 
of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") decision ordering him 
excluded from the United States on the grounds that he 
was not in possession of a valid immigrant visa and had 
procured a visa by fraud. For the reasons set forth 




Facts and Procedural History 
 
Mwongera is a native and citizen of Kenya. He is the vice- 
president and sales manager for a family business called 
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One Way Agencies, which exports Kenyan crafts for sale in 
the United States and other countries. R. at 151-53. On 
August 1, 1993, Mwongera entered the United States for 
the first time on a temporary business visitor visa, referred 
to by the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") as 
a "B-1" visa. See 8 C.F.R. S 214.2(a)(10). Mwongera 
obtained the B-1 visa on the basis of his representation to 
the consulate in Kenya that he was coming to the United 
States "to promote and market the African goods" that his 
company sold. R. at 157. 
 
Although this visa was valid only through November 20, 
1993, Mwongera secured an extension until February 20, 
1994. R. at 333-39. On February 23, 1994, three days after 
the visa expired, Mwongera left the United States and 
returned to Kenya. R. at 171. At his hearing before the 
Immigration Judge, Mwongera testified that during this first 
visit (of nearly six months' duration) he only took one or 
two orders but that he also made some cash sales and used 
the proceeds to pay his hotel and phone bills. R. at 167-68. 
 
Mwongera returned to the United States on March 27, 
1994, using the same visa. He requested, and was granted, 
a six-month stay. He successfully requested a five-month 
extension of that visa from September 27, 1994 to February 
12, 1995. R. at 344. Mwongera testified that he returned to 
this country on that second trip "[b]ecause I had left 
merchandise here and I had not accomplished what I came 
for in 1993 so I still wanted to make sure that I achieved 
my goal, looking for customers." R. at 172. During this 
visit, Mwongera incorporated his business in Pennsylvania, 
obtained a driver's license and social security card, 
purchased a van for company use, opened bank accounts, 
and made arrangements to ensure that customers could 
pay for goods using credit cards. R. at 175-78. He testified 
that he began selling more goods directly to customers, as 
opposed to taking orders, and that he would receive more 
goods from his sister in Nairobi when his stocks began to 
dwindle. R. at 184. Mwongera left the United States for 
Lisbon on approximately February 19, 1995 and returned 
to Kenya thereafter. R. at 298. 
 
After returning to Kenya, Mwongera applied for a renewal 
of his B-1 visa in March 1995, requesting a stay offive 
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months. He stated on the application that the purpose of 
his visit was: "Business promotion and attend trade 
shows." R. at 318. In answer to the question "Have you ever 
been in the U.S.A.?," Mwongera responded, "yes" and stated 
that he had been in the United States for "six months in 
1993 and six months in 1994." R. at 321. In fact, he had 
been in the country for five months in 1993 and for a total 
of eleven months in 1994. Mwongera failed to note his six- 
week stay in 1995. In response to the application's request 
that the applicant list the countries where the applicant 
lived for more than six months during the last five years, 
Mwongera listed only Kenya. R. at 320. 
 
The renewal was granted on March 20, 1995, and 
Mwongera arrived in the United States for the third time on 
March 31, 1995. R. at 316, 318. He stayed in this country 
until July 5, 1995, at which point he traveled to Lisbon. On 
attempting to reenter the United States on July 23, 1995, 
Mwongera was detained by INS officers who questioned him 
about his intentions and the scope of his business dealings 
in the United States. Mwongera submitted a thirteen-page 
handwritten statement. R. at 305-17. The INS then 
commenced exclusion proceedings. 
 
Following a hearing on October 8, 1996, the Immigration 
Judge ("IJ") concluded that because Mwongera (1) did not 
qualify as a temporary visitor for business, and thus did 
not possess a valid visa and (2) made misrepresentations 
on the March 1995 visa application that amounted to fraud 
or willful misrepresentation, he was excludable under INA 
S 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. S 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (immigrant 
not in possession of a valid visa) and INA S 212(a)(6)(C)(i), 8 
U.S.C. S 1182(a)(6)(C)(i)(visa procured by fraud or 
misrepresentation). 
 
Mwongera appealed the IJ's ruling to the BIA, arguing 
that he engaged in the proper use of a B-1 visa and that 
the INS failed to establish that he had an intent to defraud. 
The BIA, in a decision dated October 22, 1998, rejected 
both arguments and affirmed the IJ's order of exclusion. 
 
With respect to the issue of the B-1 visa, the BIA found 
that Mwongera's business had developed into one in which 
he no longer took orders to be filled in Kenya, but rather 
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sold directly to consumers in the United States. The BIA 
also found that Mwongera's plans were vague and open- 
ended with respect to his contemplated stay in the country, 
and that he had spent twenty of the previous twenty-four 
months in the United States. Accordingly, the BIA ruled 
that Mwongera's B-1 visa was not appropriate for his 
activities because Mwongera was not contemplating a 
temporary stay and because his business had developed 
such that his commercial activities had become 
employment for which he was not authorized. R. at 5-7. 
 
Turning to the fraud issue, the BIA found that Mwongera 
had significantly understated his time in the United States, 
noting that the IJ took testimony from INS deportation 
officer Linda Hoechst, who testified that if she had been 
presented with accurate representations of Mwongera's 
prior time in the United States, she would not have 
automatically granted the request but would have pursued 
a line of inquiry about Mwongera's activities. R. at 279-81. 
On the basis of this evidence, the BIA ruled that Mwongera 
had in fact engaged in willful misrepresentation of material 
facts on his visa application. R. at 8. 
 
Mwongera timely sought review. We have jurisdiction over 
this petition for review under 8 U.S.C. S 1105a(a), as 
amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
110 Stat. 3009 (Sept. 30, 1996). Under the regime created 
by IIRIRA, Mwongera's case falls under the "transitional 
rules" for judicial review, set forth at IIRIRAS 309(c)(4)(A), 
which direct that judicial review of exclusion orders is to be 
conducted pursuant to 8 U.S.C. S 1105a(a) and (c). 
 
Our review of the BIA's findings of fact is limited to 
whether they are "supported by reasonable, substantial, 
and probative evidence on the record considered as a 
whole." INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). We 
will reverse the BIA's determinations of fact only if the 
evidence "was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder 
could fail to find" for the petitioner. Id. at 483-84. To the 
extent that the BIA's decision rests on an interpretation of 
the agency's governing statute on a matter as to which 
Congress has not expressed a clear intent, we defer to the 
agency's reasonable interpretation of the statutory 
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Mwongera argues first that the BIA erred in finding that 
he was not admissible as a visitor for business purposes. 
Stating that "[t]he INS regulations regarding proper use of 
a B-1 visa [are] subject to varying interpretations," Pet. Br. 
at 12, Mwongera contends that his activities in the United 
States were permissible temporary business activities 
rather than impermissible local employment under the INA. 
 
The Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), describes a 
non-immigrant business visitor as "an alien (other than one 
coming for the purpose of study or of performing skilled or 
unskilled labor . . . ) having a residence in a foreign country 
which he has no intention of abandoning and who is 
visiting the United States temporarily for business . . . ." 
INA S 101(a)(15)(B), 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(15)(B). The agency 
has promulgated regulations that elaborate on the statute. 
The pertinent regulation states: 
 
       An alien is classifiable as a nonimmigrant visitor for 
       business (B-1) or pleasure (B-2) if the consular officer 
       is satisfied that the alien qualifies under the provisions 
       of INA 101(a)(15)(B), and that: 
 
       (1) The alien intends to leave the United States at the 
       end of the temporary stay (consular officers are 
       authorized, if departure of the alien as required by 
       law does not seem fully assured, to require the 
       posting of a bond with the Attorney General in a 
       sufficient sum to ensure that at the end of the 
       temporary visit, or upon failure to maintain 
       temporary visitor status, or any status subsequently 
       acquired under INA 248, the alien will depart from 
       the United States); 
 
       (2) The alien has permission to enter a foreign 
       country at the end of the temporary stay; and 
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       (3) Adequate financial arrangements have been made 
       to enable the alien to carry out the purpose of the 
       visit to and departure from the United States. 
 
22 C.F.R. S41.31(a). The regulation goes on to define 
"business" as used in the statute as "refer[ring] to 
conventions, conferences, consultations and other 
legitimate activities of a commercial or professional nature. 
It does not include local employment or labor for hire. . . . . 
An alien seeking to enter as a nonimmigrant for 
employment or labor pursuant to a contract or other 
prearrangement is required to qualify under the provisions 
of S 41.53." 
 
The BIA concluded that Mwongera's activities exceeded 
the scope allowed by a B-1 visa for two reasons: (1) because 
Mwongera's intended visit could not be considered 
"temporary" and (2) because Mwongera's activities crossed 
the line between permissible "business" and impermissible 
employment. We find that the BIA's findings have 
substantial support in the record and its conclusions of law 
are based upon a reasonable interpretation of the statute. 
 
In determining what constitutes a "temporary" visit 
within the intendment of INA S 101(a)(15)(B), the BIA has 
stated that the term "certainly does not contemplate a 
potentially limitless visit to the United States." Matter of 
Lawrence, 15 I.&N. 418, 420 (BIA 1975). While 
acknowledging that "[t]here are no inflexible rules to be 
applied when deciding what is `temporary' within the 
context of a business visit," the Board noted that "we have 
never held that an alien could qualify as a business visitor 
if his business activities almost exclusively involved the 
full-time management of a United States enterprise." Id. at 
419-20. 
 
In this case, the Board found Mwongera's activities to be 
sufficiently analogous to those of the aliens in Lawrence 
that Mwongera's business activities could not be considered 
"temporary." In Lawrence, two Canadian citizens sought 
entry on a B-1 visa. They were regularly engaged, through 
a business they incorporated in the United States, in the 
buying and selling of improved real estate. The BIA rejected 
the contention of one of the aliens that he was a temporary 
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business visitor, stating: "The . . . respondent did not seek 
to enter the United States for a reasonably short and 
relatively definite period of time. Nor was he coming here 
with any limited goal in mind." Id. at 420. The Board went 
on to state, "It appears that the . . . respondent might easily 
decide to remain here permanently to supervise the day-to- 
day operations of [the company], even though he may 
choose to return to Canada on a regular basis." Id. 
 
The BIA found that Mwongera, like the alien in Lawrence, 
"had no plans for the foreseeable future, but intend[ed] to 
continue coming to the United States." R. at 5. This is 
supported by various statements in Mwongera's testimony, 
including, for example, his statement that if "granted 
authorization, I'll be coming here as I was doing before, just 
coming in and out." R. at 236. Furthermore, citing 
Mwongera's testimony that he could not hire a United 
States citizen to do the work that he was performing, the 
BIA also found that "absent his continued presence his 
company could not continue to do business in the United 
States." R. at 6. Accordingly, the Board concluded that, like 
the aliens in Lawrence, Mwongera had "set no definite goals 
and made no plans to accomplish those goals," and that his 
admission to the country could not be regarded as 
temporary. We find ample support in the record for the 
Board's findings, and therefore reject Mwongera's 
contention that the Board failed adequately to consider the 
record as a whole. 
 
The BIA's second ground for holding that a B-1 visa was 
not appropriate in this case was its conclusion that 
Mwongera's activities were not "business" activities as that 
term is used in the statute. The BIA has repeatedly ruled 
that if the function performed by the visitor "is a necessary 
incident to international trade or commerce" the visitor's 
commercial activities are within the proper scope of a B-1 
visa. See, e.g., Matter of Duckett, 19 I.&N. 493, 497 (BIA 
1987); Matter of Camilleri, 17 I. & N. Dec. 441, 444 (BIA 
1980); Matter of Cote, 17 I.&N. Dec. 336, 338 (BIA 1980); 
Matter of Neill, 15 I.&N. 331, 333 (BIA 1975). The BIA has 
found such a function in cases involving truck drivers who 
deliver goods from Canada for delivery to the United States, 
see Camilleri, 171 I.&N. at 444; Cote, 17 I.&N. at 338, and 
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a railroad clerk employed by a Canadian railroad who 
entered the country on a daily basis for a portion of his 
shift in order to clear his employer's railroad cars for 
transport from the United States to Canada, see Duckett, 
19 I.&N. at 493. Conversely, the BIA has found that an 
alien engineer's activities were not incident to international 
trade when his repeated, short visits to the United States 
were for the purpose of "extending his professional 
engineering practice to the United States." Neill, 15 I.&N. at 
334. 
 
In this case, the Board found that, like the alien in Neill, 
"the majority of [Mwongera's] time spent in the United 
States is wholly central to the continued efficacy of his 
company's extension into the United States market." R. at 
6. We find substantial evidence in the record, in the form 
of Mwongera's own testimony, to support this conclusion. 
Furthermore, the Board's ruling is in line with its prior 
precedents. Mwongera was not simply delivering goods 
internationally, as was the case in Camilleri and Cote. 
Rather, by his own testimony he made it clear that he was 
extending a retail sales business that was incorporated in 
the United States. This activity places him much closer to 
the engineer in Neill, who also sought to penetrate the 
United States market. Accordingly, the Board did not err in 
finding that Mwongera was "employed" without 
authorization. 
 
Mwongera places much emphasis on the idea that the 
line between permissible business activities and 
impermissible employment is a "murky" one. Pet. Br. at 16. 
The argument that there is a lack of clarity in the definition 
of "business" under the INA, however, actually proves far 
too much. Where, as here, Congress has not expressed"an 
intention on the precise question," Chevron U.S.A. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 & 
n.9 (1984), of what constitutes business activities 
appropriate for a B-1 visa holder, we are obliged to defer to 
the agency's interpretation of its governing statute unless it 
is unreasonable. Id. In determining that Mwongera's 
activities crossed the line that divides activities that are a 
"necessary incident to international trade or commerce" on 
the one hand, and those that involve "local employment" on 
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the other, the BIA has engaged in a process of case-by-case 
interpretation of the statute. As the Supreme Court stated 
in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448-49 (1987), 
and stressed again in its most recent immigration decision, 
Aguirre-Aguirre, 119 S.Ct. at 1445, the BIA is accorded 
Chevron deference when it interprets ambiguous statutory 
provisions "through a process of case-by-case adjudication." 
There is no ground on which to hold unreasonable the 
BIA's conclusion that one who repeatedly enters the 
country to engage in the day-to-day operation of a United 
States entity that sells goods within the United States is not 
a temporary business visitor under the INA. 
 
Accordingly, we reject Mwongera's challenge to the BIA's 
ruling on the validity of his B-1 visa. Although this ground 
fully supports Mwongera's exclusion from the United 
States, we must address the fraud or willful 
misrepresentation issue, as a finding of excludability on 
this ground will add a further disability by barring 
Mwongera permanently from the United States unless he 
obtains a waiver. See Matter of Shirdel, 19 I. & N. Dec. 33, 
34 (BIA 1984). 
 
Mwongera does not argue that in filling out his visa 
application he accurately represented his prior stays in the 
United States. Rather, he urges that he did not have an 
intent to deceive and that his misstatements were not 
material. We address these contentions in turn. 
 
First, we reject Mwongera's contention that the INS is 
required to show an intent to deceive in order to satisfy the 
statute. To the contrary, the INS must show that the alien 
obtained a visa by fraud (with its concomitant intent 
requirement) or by "willfully misrepresenting a material 
fact." INA S 212(a)(6)(C)(i); 8 U.S.C.S 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). "The 
element of willfulness is satisfied by a finding that the 
misrepresentation was deliberate and voluntary." Witter v. 
I.N.S., 113 F.3d 549, 554 (5th Cir. 1997). The INS does not 
need to show intent to deceive; rather, knowledge of the 
falsity of the representation will suffice. See Id.; Forbes v. 
INS, 48 F.3d 439, 442 (9th Cir. 1995); Espinoza-Espinoza v. 
INS, 554 F.2d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 
In concluding that Mwongera had made a willful 
misrepresentation on his visa application, the BIA found 
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that Mwongera significantly understated his prior stay in 
the United States by stating that he had been in the 
country for six months in 1994 when he had in fact been 
in the country for a total of eleven months from March of 
1994 to February of 1995. R. at 7. The BIA found 
Mwongera's explanations for the discrepancy to be 
"contradictory, self-serving, and unconvincing." R. at 8. 
 
We find the record consistent with the BIA's findings. 
Mwongera gave three distinct and not-entirely consistent 
explanations for misstating his length of stay: First, he 
stated that he "did not know that it mattered and[that he] 
should be precise." R. at 226. Second, he offered that he 
"thought what mattered was the original entry[and that] 
the extension doesn't matter." R. at 228. Third, when 
Mwongera was asked why he failed to note his eleven- 
month stay in the United States in response to the visa 
application's query regarding countries where he had lived 
for more than six months during the past five years, he 
answered that he "did not understand what living meant." 
R. at 231. Accordingly, we conclude that substantial 
evidence supports the BIA's findings and that Mwongera 
has not provided evidence so compelling that a reasonable 
fact finder would be compelled to find in his favor on the 
question of the willfulness of the misrepresentation. 
 
Next, Mwongera urges that his statement regarding his 
prior stay in the country was immaterial. We disagree. A 
statement is material 
 
       if either (1) the alien is excludable on the true facts, or 
       (2) the misrepresentation tends to shut off a line of 
       inquiry which is relevant to the alien's eligibility and 
       which might well have resulted in a proper 
       determination that he be excluded. 
 
Matter of Kai Hing Hui, 15 I. & N. Dec. 288, 289 (BIA 
1975)(quoting the Attorney General's opinion in Matter of 
S-- and B-- C--, 9 I. & N. Dec. 436, 448-449 (A.G.1961)); 
Cf. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 772 
(1988)(holding, under statute providing for the 
denaturalization of naturalized citizens, 8 U.S.C.A. 
S 1451(a), that concealment or misrepresentation which has 
"a natural tendency to influence the decisions of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service" is material). 
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In this case, the record fully supports a determination 
that both of the alternative definitions of materiality set 
forth in Matter of Kai Hing Hui are satisfied. As the BIA 
noted, INS Agent Hoechst testified that if she had known of 
the discrepancy between Mwongera's actual and reported 
lengths of stay, she would have pursued a further inquiry 
as to Mwongera's business activities and would have denied 
the visa on the basis of fraud. R. at 8. Consequently, the 
record supports a determination that Mwongera was 
excludable on the true facts and that his misrepresentation 
shut off a relevant line of inquiry. We conclude therefore 
that the BIA correctly found Mwongera excludable on the 







For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for 
review. 
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